Scripts were developed in the early AI work by Roger Schank, Robert P. Abelson and their research group, and are a method of representing procedural knowledge. They are very much like frames, except the values that fill the slots must be ordered.

The classic example of a script involves the typical sequence of events that occur when a person dines in a restaurant: finding a seat, reading the menu, ordering drinks from the wait staff… In the script form, these would be decomposed into conceptual transitions, such as MTRANS and PTRANS, which refer to mental transitions and physical transitions.

Schank, Abelson and their colleagues tackled some of the most difficult problems in artificial intelligence (i.e., story understanding), but ultimately their line of work ended without tangible success. This type of work received little attention after the 1980s, but it is very influential in later knowledge representation techniques, such as case-based reasoning.

Scripts can be inflexible. To deal with inflexibility, smaller modules called memory organization packets (MOP) can be combined in a way that is appropriate for the situation.

The frame contains information on how to use the frame, what to expect next, and what to do when these expectations are not met. Some information in the frame is generally unchanged while other information, stored in “terminals,” usually changes. Different frames may share the same terminals.

A frame’s terminals are already filled with default values, which are based on how the human mind works. For example, when a person is told “a boy kicks a ball,” most people will be able to visualize a particular ball (such as a familiar soccer ball) rather than imagining some abstract ball with no attributes.

A semantic network or net is a graphic notation for representing knowledge in patterns of interconnected nodes and arcs. Computer implementations of semantic networks were first developed for artificial intelligence and machine translation, but earlier versions have long been used in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics.

What is common to all semantic networks is a declarative graphic representation that can be used either to represent knowledge or to support automated systems for reasoning about knowledge. Some versions are highly informal, but other versions are formally defined systems of logic. Following are six of the most common kinds of semantic networks, each of which is discussed in detail in one section of this article.

A definitional network emphasizes the subtype or is-a relation between a concept type and a newly defined subtype. The resulting network, also called a generalization or subsumption hierarchy, supports the rule of inheritance for copying properties defined for a super type to all of its subtypes. Since definitions are true by definition, the information in these networks is often assumed necessarily true.

Assertional networks are designed to assert propositions. Unlike definitional networks, the information in an assertional network is assumed contingently true, unless it is explicitly marked with a modal operator. Some assertional networks have been proposed as models of the conceptual structures underlying natural language semantics.

Implicational networks use implication as the primary relation for connecting nodes. They may be used to represent patterns of beliefs, causality, or inferences.

Executable networks include some mechanism, such as marker passing or attached procedures, which can perform inferences, pass messages, or search for patterns and associations.

Learning networks build or extend their representations by acquiring knowledge from examples. The new knowledge may change the old network by adding and deleting nodes and arcs or by modifying numerical values, called weights, associated with the nodes and arcs.

Hybrid networks combine two or more of the previous techniques, either in a single network or in separate, but closely interacting networks.

Some of the networks have been explicitly designed to implement hypotheses about human cognitive mechanisms, while others have been designed primarily for computer efficiency. Sometimes, computational reasons may lead to the same conclusions as psychological evidence. The distinction between definitional and assertional networks, for example, has a close parallel to Tulving’s (1972) distinction between semantic memory and episodic memory.

Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic and statement logic, is the branch of logic that studies ways of joining and/or modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more complicated propositions, statements or sentences, as well as the logical relationships and properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements. In propositional logic, the simplest statements are considered as indivisible units, and hence, propositional logic does not study those logical properties and relations that depend upon parts of statements that are not they statements on their own, such as the subject and predicate of a statement. The most thoroughly researched branch of propositional logic is classical truth-functional propositional logic, which studies logical operators and connectives that are used to produce complex statements whose truth-value depends entirely on the truth-values of the simpler statements making them up, and in which it is assumed that every statement is either true or false and not both. However, there are other forms of propositional logic in which other truth-values are considered, or in which there is consideration of connectives that are used to produce statements whose truth-values depend not simply on the truth-values of the parts, but additional things such as their necessity, possibility or relatedness to one another.

Predicate logic

The propositional logic is not powerful enough to represent all types of assertions that are used in computer science and mathematics, or to express certain types of relationship between propositions such as equivalence.

For example, the assertion “x is greater than 1”, where x is a variable, is not a proposition because you cannot tell whether it is true or false unless you know the value of x. Thus, the propositional logic cannot deal with such sentences. However, such assertions appear quite often in mathematics and we want to do inferencing on those assertions.

In addition, the pattern involved in the following logical equivalences cannot be captured by the propositional logic:

“Not all birds fly” is equivalent to “Some birds don’t fly”.

“Not all integers are even” is equivalent to “Some integers are not even”.

“Not all cars are expensive” is equivalent to “Some cars are not expensive”

Each of those propositions is treated independently of the others in propositional logic. For example, if P represents “Not all birds fly” and Q represents “Some integers are not even”, then there is no mechanism in propositional logic to find out the P is equivalent to Q. Hence, to be used in inferencing, each of these equivalences must be listed individually rather than dealing with a general formula that covers all these equivalences collectively and instantiating it as they become necessary, if only propositional logic is used.

Thus we need more powerful logic to deal with these and other problems. The predicate logic is one of such logic and it addresses these issues among others.

First-order logic

First-order logic is a formal logical system used in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science. It goes by many names; including first-order predicate calculus, the lower predicate calculus, quantification theory, and predicate logic. First-order logic is distinguished from propositional logic by its use of quantifiers; each interpretation of first-order logic includes a domain of discourse over which the quantifiers range.

There are many deductive systems for first-order logic that are sound (only deriving correct results) and complete (able to derive any logically valid implication). Although the logical consequence relation is only semi decidable, much progress has been made in automated theorem proving in first-order logic. First-order logic also satisfies several meta-logical theorems that make it amenable to analysis in proof theory, such as the Löwenheim Skolem theorem and the compactness theorem.

First-order logic is of great importance to the foundations of mathematics, where it has become the standard formal logic for axiomatic systems. It has sufficient expressive power to formalize two important mathematical theories: Zermelo Fraenkel set theory (ZF) and first-order Peano arithmetic. However, no axiom system in first order logic is strong enough to fully (categorically) describe infinite structures such as the natural numbers or the real line. Categorical axiom systems for these structures can be obtained in stronger logics such assecond-order logic.

There are representation techniques such as frames, rules, tagging, and semantic networks, which have originated from theories of human information processing. Since knowledge is used to achieve intelligent behavior, the fundamental goal of knowledge representation is to represent knowledge in a manner as to facilitate inferencing (i.e. drawing conclusions) from knowledge.

Some issues that arise in knowledge representation from an AI perspective are:

How do people represent knowledge?

What is the nature of knowledge?

Should a representation scheme deal with a particular domain or should it be general purpose?

How expressive is a representation scheme or formal language?

Should the scheme be declarative or procedural?

There has been very little top-down discussion of the knowledge representation (KR) issues and research in this area is a well-aged quillwork. There are well known problems such as “spreading activation” (this is a problem in navigating a network of nodes), “subsumption” (this is concerned with selective inheritance; e.g. an ATV can be thought of as a specialization of a car but it inherits only particular characteristics) and “classification.” For example, a tomato could be classified both as a fruit and as a vegetable.

In the field of artificial intelligence, problem solving can be simplified by an appropriate choice of knowledge representation. Representing knowledge in some ways makes certain problems easier to solve. For example, it is easier to divide numbers represented in Hindu-Arabic numerals than numbers represented as Roman numerals.

In computer science, particularly artificial intelligence, a number of representations have been devised to structure information.

KR is most commonly used to refer to representations intended for processing by modern computers, and in particular, for representations consisting of explicit objects (the class of all elephants, or Clyde a certain individual), and of assertions or claims about them (‘Clyde is an elephant’, or ‘all elephants are grey’). Representing knowledge in such explicit form enables computers to draw conclusions from knowledge already stored (‘Clyde is grey’).

Many KR methods were tried in the 1970s and early 1980s, such as heuristic question-answering, neural networks, theorem proving, and expert systems, with varying success. Medical diagnosis (e.g., Mycin) was a major application area, as were games such as chess.

In the 1980s, formal computer knowledge representation languages and systems arose. Major projects attempted to encode wide bodies of general knowledge; for example the “Cyc” project (still ongoing) went through a large encyclopedia, encoding not the information itself, but the information a reader would need in order to understand the encyclopedia: naive physics; notions of time, causality, motivation; commonplace objects and classes of objects.

Through such work, the difficulty of KR came to be better appreciated. In computational linguistics, meanwhile, much larger databases of language information were being built, and these, along with great increases in computer speed and capacity, made deeper KR more feasible.

Several programming languages have been developed that are oriented to KR. Prolog developed in 1972, but popularized much later, represents propositions and basic logic, and can derive conclusions from known premises. KL-ONE (1980s) is more specifically aimed at knowledge representation itself. In 1995, the Dublin Core standard of metadata was conceived.

In the electronic document world, languages were being developed to represent the structure of documents, such as SGML (from which HTML descended) and later XML. These facilitated information retrieval and data mining efforts, which have in recent years begun to relate to knowledge representation.

Knowledge representation and reasoning is an area of artificial intelligence whose fundamental goal is to represent knowledge in a manner that facilitates inferencing (i.e. drawing conclusions) from knowledge. It analyzes how to formally think – how to use a symbol system to represent a domain of discourse (that which can be talked about), along with functions that allow inference (formalized reasoning) about the objects. Some kind of logic is used to both supply formal semantics of how reasoning functions apply to symbols in the domain of discourse, as well as to supply operators such as quantifiers, modal operators, etc. that, along with an interpretation theory, give meaning to the sentences in the logic.

When we design a knowledge representation (and a knowledge representation system to interpret sentences in the logic in order to derive inferences from them), we have to make choices across a number of design spaces. The single most important decision to be made is the expressivity of the KR. The more expressive, the easier and more compact it is to “say something”. However, more languages that are expressive are harder to automatically derive inferences from. An example of a less expressive KR would be propositional logic. An example of a more expressive KR would be auto epistemic temporal modal logic. Less expressive KRs may be both complete and consistent (formally less expressive than set theory). KRs that are more expressive may be neither complete nor consistent.

## Recent Comments